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Resumen—Hoy en día todo gira entorno a Internet y la ciberseguridad es un asunto muy importante tanto para la economía 
como nuestras vidas personales. La constante evolución de los métodos de ataque empleados para vulnerar la seguridad de 
redes y máquinas privadas provoca la necesidad de nuevos modelos de recopilación de datos y estudios de los mismos. Los 
Honeypots son herramientas empleadas para esta tarea por su capacidad de simulación de servicios y entornos para engañar 
a los atacantes y recopilar datos sobre su modus operandi. Es por ello que en este artículo se propone un modelo de red 
distribuida de honeypots para la recopilación de inteligencia sobre ciberataques y el desarrollo de una plataforma para 
centralizar los datos generados y gestionar dicha red. 
Palabras clave—Honeypot, Ciberseguridad, Inteligencia de Amenazas, Modern Honey Network, Dionaea, Kippo 
 
Abstract—Nowadays everything is connected to the Internet and cybersecurity has become a really important topic for both the 
economy and our personal lives. The constant evolution of the methods employed to undermine the security of private networks 
and machines has caused the necessity to bring new models to collect data in order to study them. Honeypots are instruments 
employed for this task because of their capacity to simulate services and environments to lure attackers and to collect data 
about their modus operandi. That is why in this paper we propose a model of a distributed network of honeypots dedicated to 
the collection of intelligence about cyberattacks and the development of a platform to centralize the acquired data and to 
manage said network. 
Index Terms—Honeypot, Cybersecurity, Threat Intelligence, Modern Honey Network, Dionaea, Kippo  
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1 INTRODUCTION
IVEN the rapid growth of the Internet over the last 
decades and its increasing presence in the economy 
and our daily lives, security against cyberthreats is vital. 
 
Cybercrime is an ongoing and critical issue to face at 
the present. It is mainly dedicated to information and 
data theft, particularly to the ones with potential market 
value such as: login credentials, passwords, PIN codes, 
banking information or credit cards. 
 
The information is generally stolen by misleading the 
victim through phising1 methods or malware infection, 
both on client computers and servers. Many of these in-
fected computers tend to remain under the control of the 
attackers forming part of a botnet2. The botnet receives its 
instruction from one or more criminal’s servers, where 
the stolen information is also sent. These servers are 
known as C&C (Command-and-Control). [1] 
 
But nowadays it is becoming standard practice to use 
legit servers from third parties, which have been com-
promised by security breaches and infected in order to 
avoid detection. 
 
The infection of those servers is done by scanning the 
 
1 Phishing refers to the acquisition of sensitive information for mali-
cious reasons by supplanting the identity or masquerading as a trustwor-
thy entity. It is often done using fake web pages or e-mails. 
2 A botnet is a distributed network of infected computers known as 
bots, remotely controlled by a malicious entity. 
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Internet looking for open ports of services with vulnera-
bilities, to later exploit them to gain unauthorized access. 
 
 There is an incipient necessity to gather intelligence 
about the methodology used for these breaches in order 
to detect and prevent them. The study of the modus op-
erandi of the attackers is a key factor to improve the secu-
rity of the information and to guarantee the integrity of 
the systems. 
 
One of the tools used for this purpose are honeypots, 
which simulate services and environments to lure attack-
ers to believe they are penetrating a real system. The in-
teraction between the attacker and the honeypot is logged 
for posterior analysis and study. 
 
A large scale networked implementation of these tools 
could provide an important amount of data about the 
methodology used by the attackers, although the main 
limitation of honeypot technology is the high level of 
maintenance it requires. 
 
Moreover, all the gathered data remains locally in the 
machine that hosts the honeypot software, with no inher-
ent scheme of compilation of the data from the host and 
neither a correlation of the data between the different 
honeypots in the network. 
 
1.1 Objectives 
This work is done in cooperation with Blueliv, a targeted 
cyberthreat intelligence provider for enterprises, aiming 
to provide new sources of threat intelligence and counter-
intelligence data.  
 
The main objective of this project is to develop a 
honeypot management platform and deploy a network of 
honeypots in different geographical locations with a cen-
tralized server to process and store all the gathered data. 
Moreover, this platform will seek to streamline the pro-
cess of deployment of new honeypots and to streamline 
the later maintenance. The Fig. 1 shows a model of the 
platform’s expected functioning. 
 
Other objectives, in a personal level, are to expand our 
knowledge about information security, since it is a field 
that interests us, and also to acquire more specific 
knowledge about honeypot technology. 
 
The specific goals to reach for the fulfilment of the pro-
ject are: 
 
1. Develop a honeypot management platform for 
the centralized server. This platform should 
have, at least, the following capabilities: 
a. Ability to see data generated from a 
network of honeypots. 
b. Ability to deploy new honeypot sensors 
into the network from the platform. 
c. Improve the maintenance with the abil-
ity to launch fixes and updates from the 
platform. 
d. Ability to edit the configuration files of 
the honeypots from the platform. 
e. Implement a large scale usage of the 
previous capabilities (i.e. queue the de-
ployment of multiple honeypots auto-
matically) 
 
2. Deploy a network of sensors with honeypot 
technology to acquire intelligence about the 
methodology employed by the attackers. 
 
3. Implement a centralized client-server paradigm 
for the data generated from the sensors (clients) 
sending it to the server with the platform. 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed in this project consisted in 
five phases: 
 
1. Market research 
2. Analysis 
3. Design 
4. Development 
5. Deployment 
 
2.1 Market research 
An initial market research was done in order to discover 
the state of the art in the field of honeypots. The goal of 
this phase was to search for technology that could suite 
the needs of this project and could serve as basis for fur-
ther development. 
 
It was stablished that in the case that no available 
technology suited to the needs of the project, developing 
own technology would have been considered. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Model of the honeypot management platform. Deployed honey-
pots send information about attacks to the processing engine, which 
are accessed through the user interface. The engine also deploys new 
honeypots. 
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2.2 Analysis 
An analysis of the available technologies led to decide 
which of them accomplished better the requirements 
established in the objectives. 
 
After a comparison of their features, one solution was 
selected as the foundation of the project and used to de-
velop the required capabilities. The chosen solution was 
deployed in a small scale for further analysis and testing. 
To familiarize ourselves with the technology a technical 
analysis of its architecture and functions was conducted. 
 
Given the case that none of the technologies had 
served as basis, a viability study about developing own 
technology from scrap would have been done during this 
phase. 
 
2.3 Design 
In order to optimize the development phase, an extensive 
planning was necessary. After the analysis of the architec-
ture of the chosen solution, the new features to develop 
were stablished. From the data obtained during the anal-
ysis, both the initial and the new architecture and func-
tions were represented into several documents: model 
diagrams, sequence diagrams and database diagrams; 
and the concrete elements to develop were established. 
 
2.4 Development 
After the planning and designing of the functionalities to 
introduce, they were developed over the basis technolo-
gy. The testing of the new features and their overall effect 
on the platform was conducted as constant functional 
tests. 
 
2.5 Deployment 
After reaching the fulfilment of the requirements in the 
development, a large scale deployment was done to start 
the recollection of intelligence data. This was done by 
deploying several honeypot sensors in virtual servers 
located in various geographical locations; and the gener-
ated data was centralized in the developed platform. 
3 STATE OF THE ART 
To understand the state of the art, below is a more de-
tailed definition of what a honeypot is, followed by a 
brief description of the main honeypot management 
frameworks found during the market research. 
 
3.1 Honeypots 
Honeypots are security resources that simulate and pre-
tend to be services of a computing system, or the whole 
system, with vulnerabilities or weak points in order to be 
probed, attacked, compromised, used or accessed in any 
unauthorized way. [2] 
 
Their objective is to gather all the possible information 
from these attacks or unauthorized accesses in order to 
study the methodology used from the attackers and pre-
vent them in the future. Since they only simulate the envi-
ronment and responses of these services, no sensitive 
information is compromised from the attacks. [3] 
 
In the deployment phase two honeypots were used as 
sensors: Dionaea and Kippo. Dionaea is a low-interaction 
honeypot specialized in trapping and collecting malware 
samples for further analysis. It is written in Python and 
can listen to ports and emulate protocols (such as HTTP, 
HTTPS, FTP, MySQL, SMB…) to interact with the mal-
ware. Kippo is another low-interaction honeypot but it 
emulates the SSH service. It is also implemented in Py-
thon and stores information about brute-force login at-
tacks against the service. [2] [4] 
 
3.2 Honeywall CDROM 
The Honeywall CDROM is a project developed by The 
Honeynet Project. It’s a bootable installation CDROM 
designed to simplify the process of creation of a hon-
eynet3 by automating the deployment of the Honeywall4. 
The purpose of the Honeywall is to capture, control, and 
analyze all inbound and outbound activity interacting 
with the honeynet. [5] 
 
3.3 SURFcert IDS 
SURFcert IDS (formerly known as SURFids) is a distrib-
uted intrusion detection system and an early warning 
system developed by SURFnet. It is a free and open 
source software that employs sensors as proxies to redi-
rect the traffic from a monitored network, which serves as 
a bait, to a centralized one where the actual honeypots are 
located and the interaction takes place. [2] 
 
3.4 Modern Honey Network 
Modern Honey Network (MHN to abbreviate) is an open 
source software developed by ThreatStream. It provides 
deployment and events aggregation capabilities for sev-
eral of the current open source honeypot software availa-
ble. [6] 
4 ANALYSIS 
The market research provided a view of the state of the 
art in honeypot technology and three honeypot manage-
ment platforms were found: Honeywall CDROM, SURF-
cert IDS and MHN.  
 
These were possible candidates to use as basis to reach 
the fulfilment of the objectives, but further analysis was 
required to stablish the actual compatibility. Table 1 
shows a comparison of the main features. 
 
3 A honeynet is the network formed by two or more honeypots. 
4 Term used by The Honeynet Project to refer to the gateway of a hon-
eynet. 
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It was easy to conclude that Honeywall CDROM had 
low compatibility with the objectives of this project, since 
its approach was focused on monitoring a local network, 
it had no large scale distributed solution and it also had 
become partially outdated with no active maintenance.  
 
Both MHN and SURFcert IDS had better compatibility 
and could serve as basis for this project. They were simi-
lar in some features but they were totally different in the 
distribution paradigm. In one hand, MHN allocated the 
honeypots in the distributed sensors and sent the collect-
ed data to the main server, which acted as processing 
engine and database. On the other hand, SURFcert IDS 
used its sensors similarly to a proxy to redirect the traffic 
to its centralized network where the actual honeypots and 
the database were. 
 
Even though SURFcert’s distribution simplified nota-
bly the installation and maintenance processes, in case of 
a security breach the damage scope, as possible leak-
age/destruction of information or system’s integrity loss, 
would be considerably higher in comparison to MHN. 
 
Finally, MHN provides several installation scripts in 
bash to automate the installation of honeypots and its 
configuration with the platform. 
 
After considering all these matters, MHN was selected 
as technology to use as basis, especially because of its 
approach of the distribution paradigm and its lower 
damage scope. 
 
4.1 Modern Honey Network’s architecture 
From MHN there are two key functionalities required to 
mention: event aggregation capabilities and honeypot 
installation and configuration scripts. Even though, both 
of them are important additions for the project, they pre-
sent some lack of features as explained next. The devel-
opment phase will partially consist on improving these 
features among including others. 
 
The installation and configurations scripts are written 
in bash language and include support for several types of 
honeypots, such as: Dionaea, Kippo, Wordpot, Snort and 
many others. But these scripts require the external access 
to the remote host to manually run the script. 
 
The data aggregation capabilities include the centrali-
zation of some data generated by the network of sensors. 
These data includes source IP, attacked port, associated 
protocol and geolocation. Some honeypots have addition-
al support on the gathered information, such as Kippo’s 
most used users and passwords. It also provides some 
data analysis as daily attack counts, a real-time map of 
attacks and some filtering options of the stored attacks. 
But there is a lack of detailed information about the at-
tack, such as the data of the logs. To understand how the 
data aggregation works, below is an explanation of the 
architecture and its representation can be seen in Fig. 2. 
 
MHN’s architecture is structured in six layers: 
 Honeypot sensors 
 Hpfeeds 
 Mnemosyne 
 Databases 
 Rest API 
 Web application 
 
In the first layer there is the network of honeypots de-
ployed in remote hosts to act as sensors. When these sen-
sors are attacked, some data about the attack is sent to the 
MHN’s server. This is done using the next layer. 
 
To stablish a communication channel through which 
the attack event data is sent, the Hpfeeds protocol is used. 
Hpfeeds is a lightweight authenticated publish-subscribe 
protocol largely used with honeypot technology. [7] 
 
Once the data has been received into the platform, 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF FEATURES 
Honeywall CDROM MHN SURFcert IDS 
Monitoring  Local network Remote hosts Remote hosts 
Monitoring method 
Network’s gateway & local 
sensors 
Remote sensors & 
Central server 
Remote sensors & 
Central network 
Honeypot location Internal network External host Internal host/network 
Distributed ✗ ✓ ✓ 
Distribution paradigm Not distributed 
Distributed sensors send 
monitored data to central 
server 
Distributed sensors act as 
proxies and redirect traffic 
to central network where it 
is monitored 
Damage scope in case of 
security breach 
High Low High 
Open source ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Free ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Active maintenance ✗ ✓ ✓ 
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Mnemosyne is the engine that processes it. It is responsi-
ble of the next three layers: the normalization and ade-
quacy of the heterogeneous data generated from different 
types of honeypots, to provide persistence for hpfeeds 
using a mongoDB database and to expose the normalized 
data through a RESTful API. [8] 
 
Both Hpfeeds and Mnemosyne are implemented in Py-
thon; though, currently there are implementations in 
other languages. 
 
Finally, the last layer consists in a web application that 
serves as user interface to consult the data. It is imple-
mented with Flask, which is a microframkework that 
combines a frontend implemented with HTML templates 
and a backend in Python which does the main work and 
renders the templates. [9] 
 
5 DESIGN 
After analyzing the architecture of MHN and its capabili-
ties, the remaining features to develop and implement in 
order to achieve the objectives were stablished: 
 
1. Ability to deploy new honeypot sensors from the 
platform using the installation scripts. This 
would be done through: 
a. Implementation of SSH capabilities into 
the backend of the platform. 
b. Modification of the frontend. 
c. Implementation of task queuing (back-
ground asynchronous execution) to 
avoid timeouts in the web interface. 
d. Enhance task queuing capabilities to 
implement multiple deployment instruc-
tions. 
 
2. Maintenance capabilities for the deployed 
honeypots through: 
a. Persistence of the SSH credentials to 
maintain the access to the remote hosts. 
b. Development and implementation of 
update scripts. 
c. Modification of the frontend. 
 
3. Ability to edit configuration files of the deployed 
honeypots from the platform. 
 
The previous features to develop were the most criti-
cal to the fulfillment of the project, but next are some less 
prioritized features stablished to develop in case that the 
time frame allowed it:  
 
4. Improve the data recollection including logs and 
other files from the honeypots. 
 
5. Improve data analysis through: 
a. Implementation of a dashboard view. 
b. Implementation of a detailed view of an 
attack. 
 
5.1 Views 
As stated earlier, the web interface is built on Flask micro-
framework. Flask is implemented in Python and uses 
Jinja25 templates to create the HTML views for the web 
application. [10] 
 
The basic implementation of Flask is simple. Suppose a 
view that renders the template for the deployment page. 
This view, when called, will receive some data through a 
POST method, will execute some determined Python 
instructions using the received data, use a variable to 
indicate the success or failure of the operation and finally 
render the template. The implementation of the previous 
view, omitting library imports and instances’ creation, 
would be as stated next: 
 
@route('/deploy/', methods=['GET', 'POST']) 
def deploy(): 
 # Deployment operations would go here with 
# a variable ‘res’ indicating the result 
# of the execution. 
 return render_template('deploy.html', 
result=res) 
 
The @route decorator declares the associated URL 
that will trigger the function. It also declares which meth-
ods are allowed, by default GET if nothing is declared. In 
this example the POST method is necessary to receive the 
data used for the later execution and the GET method to 
deliver template with the result of the execution. 
 
5 Jinja2 is a template engine for Python. It is a text-based template lan-
guage that allows calling functions on objects and sandboxed execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Architecture of Modern Honey Network. The honeypot layer 
generates data, which is recollected, processed and stored as ex-
plained previously. Finally, the access to the stored data is done 
through the user interface or the RESTful API. 
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Once called the URL, the function is executed and the 
res variable stores its result. The function returns the 
rendered template including the result. 
 
The Jinja2 template would be: 
 
<html> 
 <head> 
  <title>Deployment result</title> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  The result is: {{ result }} 
 </body> 
</html> 
 
During the rendering, the {{ result }} variable is 
substituted with the value given by res in the previous 
code. 
 
Below is the list of views and templates developed to 
introduce the new features: 
1. Deployment layer: 
a. Deployment page (deploy.html) – A 
form to introduce the deployment in-
formation (honeypot, IP, auth. creden-
tials…) 
b. Execution page (ssh.html) – Uses the 
given information to authenticate the ac-
cess to the remote host and launches the 
deployment using SSH. 
c. List of deployments (deploy_list.html) – 
A historic of the launched deployments 
and access to the execution details. 
d. Details of execution (status.html) – To 
check the execution output and errors. 
2. Maintenance layer 
a. Maintenance page (maintain.html) – To 
select the honeypot and the maintenance 
task. 
b. Execution page (update.html) – To 
launch an update to a previously de-
ployed sensor. 
3. Configuration edit layer 
a. Edit configuration (config.html) – To ed-
it the configuration file of a previously 
deployed honeypot. 
 
5.2 Database 
MHN relays on two databases: 
 A non-relational mongoDB database employed 
by Mnemosyne to maintain all the information 
related to hpfeeds and attack events. 
 A relational SQLite database which maintains all 
the information regarding the platform, as for 
example the users and the sensors’ data. 
A diagram of the mongoDB database is available in the 
section A1 of the annex. For the introduced functionali-
ties, it wasn’t necessary to modify this database. 
 
To integrate the new functionalities it was necessary to 
modify the SQLite database, concretely the ‘sensors’ table. 
 
This table was modified to introduce the SSH authenti-
cation credentials of the remote host: a username and a 
password or a private key file. Paths to locate the external 
files regarding the configurations of the honeypots were 
also introduced. These paths include both the local loca-
tion and the remote host’s location. 
 
Fig. 2 shows the original state of this table, while Fig. 3 
shows it after the modifications done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Table for the sensors’ persistence, which was modified in order 
to persist the new functionalities’ data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Sensors’ table modified to persist the SSH authentication cre-
dentials for the remote host and the honeypot’s configuration files. 
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6 DEVELOPMENT 
Below is the summary of the work done during the de-
velopment phase.  
 
6.1 New honeypot deployment 
Starting the development phase, the first step was to inte-
grate SSH capabilities to the backend in order to deploy a 
new sensor in a remote host given the authentication 
credentials. This was done using Paramiko, a Python 
library for the SSHv2 protocol implementation. [11] A 
simplified version of Paramiko’s usage is shown below: 
 
ssh = paramiko.SSHClient() 
ssh.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAdd
Policy()) 
ssh.connect(ip, username=user, password=pw) 
stdin,stdout,stderr = ssh.exec_command(command) 
ssh.close() 
 
First of all, an instance of the SSH client is created and 
its policy regarding unknown hosts is declared as to ac-
cept all. Next, a connection is stablished using the in-
stance previously created passing the authentication cre-
dentials. The execution is launched and its input, output 
and errors are saved in stdin, stdout and stderr respec-
tively. Finally, the connection is closed. 
 
Also, as explained in the section 5.1, some new views 
with their respective templates were necessary. The first 
view renders a page with a form to input the remote 
host’s information and the honeypot to deploy. This in-
formation is sent to the second view through POST meth-
od, which stablishes the SSH connection with the given 
information. 
 
The first version of this implementation used to stab-
lish the SSH connection, executed the command and 
waited for the result before rendering the page to show 
the result. This provoked some timeout issues with the 
web server, which also made the SSH execution to fail 
and, so, the honeypot wouldn’t be successfully installed. 
 
In order to solve this issue, a different approach was 
applied. The execution of the SSH commands is handled 
by Celery, an external asynchronous task queuing service. 
A function independent to the view stablishes the SSH 
connection and executes the commands. This function is 
declared as a Celery task using the following decorator 
above it: 
 
@celery.task 
def ssh_exec(ip, user, pw, pkey, command,  
honeypot): 
 
Before adding the task to the queue, the view tests the 
given authentication credentials in order to validate them. 
If the authentication is successful, the task is queued and 
the view renders the page indicating that the deployment 
has been launched. In case that the authentication fails or 
any other error happens, the page is rendered informing 
about the error and the task is not queued. 
 
To check the status of the queued tasks a page has 
been added. In this page, all the tasks are listed, and if 
finished, the user can access to the details of the execu-
tion. All the information regarding the tasks is saved as 
JSON data files. 
 
Finally, a page to show the details and result of a de-
termined execution was added. 
 
Fig. 5 shows a summary of the process followed for a 
new honeypot deployment. 
 
6.2 Honeypot update 
To implement the ability to launch updates from the plat-
form, as represented in Fig. 6, the first task was to adapt 
the SQLite database to persist the new information as 
explained in the section 5.2. 
 
To update the honeypots, new scripts in bash language 
were created. This scripts work in the same way as the 
original scripts of MHN but they execute the instructions 
required to update a previously deployed honeypot as 
provided by their creators. Currently only scripts for 
Dionaea and Kippo have been developed. 
 
Finally, the views and pages indicated in the section 
5.1 were created to add this feature to the frontend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Sequence diagram of the process of a new honeypot deploy-
ment. 
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6.3 Edit honeypot’s configurations 
Using the resources of the features previously developed, 
it was easy to implement the editing of the remote con-
figuration of a honeypot as shown in Fig. 7. Concretely 
through the database modifications explained in the sec-
tion 5.2 and the some of the views for the maintenance 
capabilities. 
 
There is a local copy of each honeypot’s configuration 
file in the platform’s server which the user can edit. When 
the editing is done, these configurations are sent through 
the usage of SSH and SCP to the remote host where the 
honeypot is located and overwrites its configuration file. 
 
Once this process is done successfully the local config-
uration file also gets overwritten by new one to reflect 
these changes for future usage and consistency.  
 
7 DEPLOYMENT 
The final phase of this project was the deployment of a 
distributed network of sensors with the platform central-
izing the information. In order to do so, eight virtual ma-
chines located in various geographical points were creat-
ed to host the honeypot sensors. The honeypots deployed 
were Kippo and Dionaea. Initially, there was the same 
amount of sensors of both of them but since Kippo 
honeypots received more interaction and provided more 
data, the deployment was focused on them. 
 
The virtual machines employed, using Ubuntu 14.04 
distribution with 32-bit architecture, were hosted in Dig-
italOcean. The reason behind using this provider resides 
on the speed and simplicity of creating a virtual machine 
they offer, which settles to the rapid-and-easy deploy-
ment philosophy that this project tries to stablish. And the 
reason behind using Ubuntu 14.04 x32 is the stability and 
compatibility that offers, since most honeypots are tested 
with this configuration. Table 2 shows the basic infor-
mation about the deployed sensors. 
 
The central platform was also deployed in a Digital-
Ocean virtual machine located in Amsterdam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Sequence diagram of the process of updating of a previously 
deployed honeypot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Sequence diagram representing the process followed to edit a 
remote honeypot’s configuration file. 
TABLE 2 
DEPLOYED HONEYPOTS 
Host Name Honeypot Location 
Node1 Dionaea New York 
Node2 Kippo New York 
Node3 Kippo San Francisco 
Node4 Dionaea Amsterdam 
Node5 Kippo Amsterdam 
Node6 Kippo London 
Node7 Kippo Frankfurt 
Node8 Kippo Singapore 
Node9 Kippo Singapore 
Node10 Dionaea Singapore 
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8 RESULTS 
 
After ten days of deployment, the sensors already had 
gathered a considerable amount of data produced by 
numerous port scans and attacks as shown in the Table 3. 
 
The average amount of the total daily interaction re-
ceived is between 7500-9000. 
 
Note that many of these interactions are not specifical-
ly attack events, many of them are port scans which usu-
ally are reconnaissance actions for future attacks but not 
attacks by themselves. 
 
The top attackers’ IP were mainly from China, Russia 
and Japan, but many attacks were also received from IP 
addresses located in Poland, Italy, United Kingdom, 
France and United States. 
 
The most attacked port is the 22, associated to the SSH 
service. This is partly due to the fact that Kippo works 
exclusively with this service while Dionaea works with 
various, such as: HTTP, HTTPS, FTP and MySQL among 
others. Still, SSH protocols’ interaction numbers are sig-
nificantly higher to the other services’ and, so, are worthy 
of a more detailed review. 
 
Kippo simulates a fake SSH service with ability to in-
teract with the attacker. The default user-password is 
‘root:123456’, which attackers usually try to guess using 
brute-force or dictionary attacks. If they manage to suc-
cessfully log in, Kippo tries to satisfy their demands in a 
controlled environment simulating some of the most 
usual commands (for instance: wget, ping, apt, ssh, ad-
duser…) while logging all the activity and saving the 
downloaded files for further analysis. 
 
The Fig. 8 shows a diagram with the most tried user 
and password combinations by the attackers in order to 
break in. 
 
Once the intruders have successfully logged in, three 
patterns of behavior are observed: 
1. No action is done right after the break in. This 
could be due to: the attack being the recon-
naissance and data storage phase prior to a 
mass automated attack or the attacker noticing 
the honeypot environment. 
2. Manually check information about the simu-
lated host, such as the active processes, active 
users and other general information about the 
machine. Some of these cases lead to behavior 
3 if the honeypot isn’t detected. Others detect 
the honeypot due to the lack of activity and no 
further activity is done. 
3. Download executable files from a remote host 
and leave them executing in the background. 
This happens when the intrusion is automated 
or the attacker doesn’t notice the honeypot 
environment. 
 
The most relevant behavior is the last one, since it pro-
vides intelligence about the attackers’ methodology and 
their course of actions once the system has been penetrat-
ed. 
 
 The objective of these files is commonly to keep moni-
toring the machine and exploit it for further malicious 
actions, such as opening a backdoor to connect to a C&C 
server and receive orders. These orders are principally to 
make DDoS attacks to determined IP addresses. In some 
cases, the backdoor is used to sell the access (the authenti-
cation credentials) in the black market in order to be used 
as part of a botnet or employed for further distribution of 
malware. 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Reached the deadline of the project, the main objectives 
stablished have been achieved. Even though the initial 
planning suffered a few setbacks and had to be readjust-
ed, it was correctly followed. These readjustments were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Most used combinations of user-password in the attacks 
received to the Kippo honeypots. 
TABLE 3 
ATTACK EVENTS 
Name-Honeypot (Location) Scans/Attacks 
Node1-Dionaea (NY) 4801 
Node2-Kippo (NY) 2478 
Node3-Kippo (SF) 3266 
Node4-Dionaea (AMS) 2929 
Node5-Kippo (AMS) 991 
Node6-Kippo (LON) 27036 
Node7-Kippo (FRA) 5097 
Node8-Kippo1 (SNG) 15482 
Node9-Kippo2 (SNG) 1949 
Node10-Dionaea (SGP) 1744 
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done in order to improve the employed methodology, 
such as the introduction of a design phase to optimize the 
development. 
 
Currently, a functioning centralized platform with in-
telligence data gathering capabilities by means of a dis-
tributed network of honeypots has been deployed. The 
platform is able to not only centralize the acquired data, 
but also to deploy new honeypot sensors and configure 
them, reducing considerably the complexity of this pro-
cess. It also simplifies the later maintenance, allowing 
launching updates and the editing of the configuration 
files from the platform. 
 
The data gathered so far by the network of sensors al-
ready provided valuable information about behaviors, 
trends of attacks and, in general, intelligence about cyber-
threats.  
 
From a personal point of view, this project has served 
to learn about honeypot technology and to expand the 
previous knowledge about information security. It also 
helped to take contact with many technologies, such as 
Flask, mongoDB and Celery; to experience all the steps of 
a real development project; to understand the importance 
of an extensive design stage and how positively it affects 
to the development; and to be able to face unexpected 
problems and find suitable solutions. 
 
The work done during this project could serve as basis 
for a corporative project. However, there are still many 
features and functionalities that could be developed and 
implemented. 
10 FUTURE WORK 
 
The scheduled time has been the principal limitation on 
the features that could be developed. There’s plenty of 
room for many other functionalities and improvements 
that could be implemented. Medium and low priority 
objectives, such as improving the data recollection, im-
plementing a dashboard view or a more detailed view of 
an attack event, have not been achieved in the available 
time frame. These leave a path to follow in future pro-
jects. 
 
There is a considerable amount of improvements that 
could be introduced in the platform, such as compatibility 
with more types of honeypots and its consequent mainte-
nance requirements.  
 
Regarding the sensors, there are also improvements 
that could be introduced. For example, Kippo could be 
improved to offer better responses to the attackers when 
prompted for information about the machine in order to 
resemble a more realistic environment. This would help 
to deceive intruders and convince them to pursue their 
activity. 
 
Finally, a further and more exhaustive analysis of the 
methodology of the attackers could be done using the 
acquired data, such as the downloaded files, since there 
was not enough time to include it to the project. 
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Annex 
A1. MONGODB DATABASE DIAGRAM 
Fig. 1-4 show the main collections of the non-relational 
mongoDB database as mentioned in section 5.2. This da-
tabase is managed by Mnemosyne to save all the incom-
ing data from Hpfeeds as explained in section 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The ‘hpfeed’ collection saves the raw messages received 
from the hpfeed channels. This data usually come in JSON format. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The ‘session’ collection summarizes the interaction of a 
honeypot with the attackers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The ‘daily_stats’ collection summarizes the data used to 
provide the statistics about the daily interactions of the honeypots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The ‘counts’ collection summarizes various types of counts 
over time ranges in order to speed up aggregation queries. 
